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This paper investigates the effectiveness of the European Union’s regional policy with a focus 
on the federal structure of its member states. An empirical model is employed to estimate the 
effect varying decentralization among the member states has on the conditional effectiveness 
of Structural Funds expenditure. The results suggest that Structural Funds are more effective 
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The European Union uses a system of conditional grants known as the Structural Funds with 
the objective to promote economic and social cohesion among its member states. Whether the 
objective is appropriate in itself and whether it can be reached with this instrument is subject 
to an ongoing debate.  
While the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of Structural Funds in general is rather 
mixed  (e.g.  Boldrin  and  Canova  2001;  Beugelsdijk  and  Eijfinger  2005),  considerations 
drawing  on  the  diversity  of  countries  suggest,  that  the  effectiveness  of  regional  policy 
crucially depends on the institutional environment in which it is implemented (e.g. De La 
Fuente  2002).  Ederveen,  de  Groot,  and  Nahuis  (2006)  observe  that  Structural  Funds 
expenditure is conditionally effective, when institutional quality is controlled for. Similarly, 
Esposti and Bussoletti (2004) point to the fact, that interacting policies also affect the impact 
of regional measures. 
So far the federal structure of the EU Member States did not attract much attention when the 
effectiveness of the Structural Funds is considered. Although the EU Commission requires the 
inclusion  of  regional  authorities  and  stakeholders  in  the  planning  and  implementation 
procedure of programs funded by Structural Funds, one should expect that the performance is 
better, where the sub-national authorities are more accustomed to pursuing economic policy 
and implementing programs. This should be the case in states with a higher degree of sub-
national autonomy. Using panel-data for a sample of 13 EU Member States from 1960-1995 
the effects of Structural Funds on growth are analysed. When a decentralization index by 
Stegarescu  (2004)  as  a  measure  of  sub-national  autonomy  is  introduced  as  an  interacting 
variable, it turns out that increasing sub-national autonomy has a significantly positive impact 
on the effectiveness of the Union’s Structural Funds expenditure. 
In the following section the European regional policy is sketched in its basic aspects and some 
theoretical considerations for the connection between decentralization and the effectiveness of 
Structural funds are given. Section 3 introduces the empirical model. In section 4 the data are 
presented. The results of the regression are depicted and discussed in section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. The Theoretical Framework 
 
The main objective of European regional policy is economic and social cohesion among the 
member  states  of  the  European  Union.  To  reduce  differences  in  economic  development 
between  the  regions  and  the  lag  of  the  most  disadvantaged  regions,  Structural  Funds  are employed to allocate support to those regions. The Structural Funds are subdivided into four 
different funds, each with a specific thematic area: the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF)  is  aimed  at  financing  infrastructure,  job-creating  investment,  local  development 
projects and aid to small firms; the European Social Fund (ESF) supports the employment 
goals  of  the  European  Union;  the  European  Agricultural  Guidance  and  Guarantee  Fund 
(EAGGF) is used for the adaptation of agricultural structures and measures to promote rural 
development;  the  Financial  Instrument  for  Fisheries  Guidance  (FIFG)  contributes  to  the 
reform of the Fisheries sector. Additional to these Funds there is the Cohesion Fund, which 
was created to assist the four cohesion countries (i.e. Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and Spain) in 
reaching the criteria for joining the single currency and is now devoted to the least prosperous 
states of the European Union (i.e. the ten new member states Greece, Portugal and Spain). 
In 1975 the ERDF constituted the first effort to conduct specific measures to reduce regional 
disparities across the Community. Since the Single  European Act in 1986, economic  and 
social cohesion is among the explicitly formulated objectives of the European Union, laying a 
foundation for a genuine regional policy. Two technical features of the Structural Funds were 
introduced with the Single European Act: the operational periods over which spending is 
scheduled; and the specific objectives expenditures are attributed to (Vanhove 1999: 480ff.).  
During the first two operational periods 1988-1993 and 1994-1999 there were six objectives 
to which expenditures were assigned. Objective 1, being the most important, covered the least 
prosperous regions (having a per capita GDP of less than 75% of the EU average). The other 
objectives  related  to  mitigating  industrial  decline  (objective  2),  reducing  long-term 
unemployment  (objective  3),  adaptation  to  industrial  change  (objective  5),  support  for 
agricultural sectors and rural areas (objective 5a and 5b), and assistance to sparsely populated 
areas (objective 6). 
At the beginning of the third planning period (2000-2006) the objectives were consolidated, 
reducing them to three. The first remained largely unchanged and focuses on regions where 
economic development is lagging behind. Objective 2 deals with revitalizing areas facing 
structural difficulties in regions that have an above-average economic development (viz. are 
not objective 1-regions). Objective 3 is to promote the development of human resources and 
support the employment perspectives of the long-term unemployed. In geographical terms, 
objective 3 covers the entire EU territory besides objective 1-regions. Additionally to these 
objectives, there are the four Community Initiatives (Interreg, URBAN, EQUAL, Leader), 
which  are  designed  to  finance  projects  on  specific  policy  areas.  For  the  planning  period 
beginning in 2007, again, a reformulation of the objectives is proposed. From the different Structural Funds the various objectives are financed to differing degrees. 
During the operational period 2000-2006 more than 2/3 of the total Structural Funds spending 
is going to objective 1. Also the four Community initiatives are covered from the Structural 
Funds.
1 94.65% of the Structural Funds expenditure goes to objective 1-3 and 5.35% to the 
Community  Initiatives.  From  2000-2006  195  billion  EUR  are  made  available  for  the 
Structural  Funds  for  the  EU-15.  Additionally  there  is  18  billion  EUR  provided  for  the 
Cohesion Fund. Together with 22 billion EUR for pre-accession measures and 22 billion EUR 
for structural measures in the accession countries in 2004-2006 this amounts roughly 37% of 
EU total expenditure.
2 
From perspective of fiscal federalism expenditures from the Structural Funds take the form of 
conditional grants from the European level to the member states. There are two forms of 
intergovernmental  grants  that  are  theoretically  linked  to  specific  purposes.  While 
unconditional grants should be used for fiscal equalization across jurisdictions primarily based 
on equity grounds
3, conditional grants (mostly in form of matching grants) are supposed to 
internalize  spill-over  benefits  that  accrue  in  vertical  or  horizontal  direction  from  one 
jurisdiction to the federal level or other jurisdictions. While the size of the unconditional 
grants then is determined by the preferences for equity within the federation, the conditional 
grant should equal the size of the external effect related to the activity pursuant to a Pigouvian 
subsidy (Oates 1990: 1126f.). 
Based on this distinction the objective of economic and social cohesion alone is not sufficient 
for an engagement of the EU in co-financing expenditures for regional policy measures. Only 
when the implemented policies create spill-over effects to the Union level co-financing at the 
rate of the external effect is warranted. While some authors dismiss the existence of such spill 
over effects and call for a pure compensation mechanism (e.g. Heinemann 1999), Fenge and 
Wrede (2004) argue that there are in fact positive vertical externalities, although they are 
small compared to the co-financing rates of up to 85% in the Structural Funds. 
The major share of the Structural Funds expenditure then has to be explained as a means of 
redistribution  or  compensation  between  the  member  states.  Although  deeper  integration 
between the member states creates welfare gains through enhancing the efficiency of markets, 
those welfare gains are not evenly distributed among the member states. Then spending by the 
EU can be seen as a system of side-payments to ensure the consent of all participants in the 
                                                 
1 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/funds/prord/sf_en.htm 
2 http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/intro/working4_en.htm 
3 There exists also the argument that unconditional grants should be used to create a level playing-field as a basis 
for interjurisdictional competition.  collective decision-making process at the EU level. The reason for the implementation of 
regional policies then is cohesion in the first place, but to back up ongoing integration. If 
fiscal equalization is the primary function of Structural Funds, then – according to the theory 
of fiscal federalism – unconditional grants should be used. However, on grounds of political 
acceptability, the use of conditional grants may still be warranted (Folkers 1995). 
The effectiveness of Structural Funds is affected by these considerations through the fact that 
the Funds have to be invested in a growth stimulating way to bring about the convergence 
process they are designed for. Although Structural Funds have to be invested there are reasons 
to cast doubt, whether they are used in a way that really promotes growth. First, the Funds 
have often to be invested in pre-specified projects that are not always growth promoting, such 
as environmental projects. Second, while the co-funding requirement ensures that resources 
actually are invested, it may cause crowding out public funds from otherwise implemented 
projects. It is not a priori clear that projects that qualify for EU-funding have a higher growth 
promoting capability than other public projects. 
In the literature several attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of Structural Funds in achieving 
cohesion between the member states or the regions have been made. In general, Structural 
Funds are assumed to be effective, if they foster a trend to convergence across regions or 
countries.  Theoretically  two  concepts  of  convergence  can  be  distinguished.  While  the 
unconditional version of β-convergence implies a trend to common steady state across the 
considered units, conditional β-convergence allows for different steady-states income levels 
but expects countries with a lower income grow faster. In contrast σ-convergence relates to 
the dispersion of income levels or growth rates. For sigma-convergence to take place the gaps 
between income levels or growth rates across countries or regions must narrow (see e.g. Islam 
2003: 314f.). 
The evidence for the effectiveness of Structural Funds in the literature is mixed. Boldrin and 
Canova (2001) analyze a set of 185 NUTS 2 regions during 1980-1996. They apply tests for 
different convergence and divergence concepts to GDP and labor productivity. Their results 
are  not  supportive  of  unconditional  beta-convergence  for  regional  per  capita  income.  If 
allowed for different steady states they still do not find beta-convergence in terms of per 
capita income, but a small amount of convergence in labor productivity. Boldrin and Canova 
(2001) also analyze directly various measures of dispersion for different groups of regions. 
When looking at regions benefiting from SF they do not find signs of accelerating growth 
rates. Accordingly they reject the hypothesis of a beneficial effect of the EU’s regional policy. A contrasting view is presented by Ederveen et al. (2002). Using cross-country regression 
analysis for the period from 1977 to 1996 for twelve EU-countries they find evidence for 
beta-convergence among EU-countries. Also for a sample of 160 European regions at NUTS 
II-level between 1984 and 1996 they find beta-convergence. For both samples they also detect 
sigma-convergence. Exploring the issue from a within country perspective they observe beta- 
and sigma convergence in the majority of countries. In an additional analysis Ederveen et al. 
(2002)  include  the  expenditure  on  Structural  Funds  in  their  regressions.  They  observe 
convergence among European countries and regions. On the country-level, the impact of the 
Structural Funds is positive when interacted with the countries openness. On the regional 
level, Structural Funds only have a positive impact on economic growth when region specific 
steady states are allowed for. Finally, Ederveen et al. (2002) survey a number of convergence 
studies that take account of Structural Funds expenditure. The reported results are also very 
mixed. Generally simulation studies point to a more positive effect of the expenditure than 
regression results. The authors take that as evidence for crowding out of national aid to poorer 
regions. In a more recent study Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) observe beta-convergence 
among 15 EU member states covering the period from 1995-2001. They also find a positive 
relationship between (lagged) Structural Funds expenditure and GDP growth at the national 
level. 
In line with these observations De La Fuente (2002) points to the fact that Structural Funds 
expenditure  takes  place  in  a  country-specific  environment.  Therefore  he  argues  that  the 
inclusion of control variables might play a crucial role for the results. Ederveen, de Groot and 
Nahuis  (2006)  argue  that  Structural  funds  are  conditionally  effective.  They  estimate  a 
dynamic panel specification using data on 13 EU-countries 1960-1995 in order to determine 
the effect of Structural Funds expenditure on growth on a national level. As conditioning 
variables they introduce a range of measures that all capture some sort of institutional quality. 
Among those variables are the degree of trade openness, inflation, trust, corruption and a 
direct measure of institutional quality. The impact of the Structural Funds themselves turns 
out to be negative. However, when measures of institutional quality are taken into account as 
interacting variables, the interaction terms become significantly positive. Similarly, Esposti 
and Bussoletti (2004) show that additional policy measures, in his case spending on Common 
Agricultural Policy,  can have significant counter-effects on the  effectiveness of Structural 
Funds expenditure. 
While  the  mentioned  studies  explore  the  effectiveness  of  Structural  Funds  expenditure  in 
various ways, the institutional set-up or the federal structure of the member states did not attract much attention in this context. There is a branch of literature that explicitly explores 
whether  the  degree  of  decentralization  has  an  independent  impact  on  the  growth  of  an 
economy. While there is no formal theory of fiscal decentralization and growth, there are a 
number  of  arguments  concerning  the  connection  between  economic  performance  and 
federalism. 
Besides  the  famous  Decentralization  Theorem  that  states  that  a  federal  system  is  able  to 
provide public goods more efficiently as it can differentiate the provision according to the 
differing  preferences  of  its  citizens,  arguments  related  to  interjurisdictional  competition 
strengthen  the  case  for  better  economic  outcomes  in  federal  systems.  Federal  states  are 
expected to exhibit higher innovative capacity, while constraining the governments’ power to 
extort excessive taxes from their citizens (see e.g. Oates 1999). On the other hand there are 
concerns that decentralized governments are more exposed to the demands of local interest 
groups for protectionist policies. Also, interjurisdictional competition may actually increase 
incentives to imitate and free-ride on innovations of other units, thus reducing the extent of 
policy innovation in a federation. Reviewing arguments for the federalism-growth connection 
Feld, Zimmermann and Döring (2004) point to the multi-dimensionality of this connection. 
They also provide a survey of empirical studies on the link between economic growth and 
federalism in various settings. However, the evidence remains inconclusive. 
The  implementation  of  the  Structural  Funds  is  conducted  in  collaboration  between  the 
different levels of government within the European Union. The European Council decides 
upon the Commission’s proposal on the budget and the general rules for the Structural Funds’ 
execution. Then, the member states and the affected regions draft operational programs that 
specify  strategies  and  priorities  for  action,  as  well  as  the  funding  schemes.  After  the 
Commission’s  approval,  these  operational  programs  are  implemented  by  the  authorized 
bodies. Additionally, the rather general operational programs are worked out in greater detail 
by national and regional bodies.
4 
So, while the conceptual design of the Structural Funds is decided at the European level, their 
execution strongly depends on the activity of national and regional authorities. The degree to 
which regional authorities have an actual impact on the specific design and implementation of 
Structural Funds programs is expected to differ between the member states according to their 
institutional setup. If the policies that are financed through Structural Funds are sensitive to 
specific regional needs, then member states with a higher degree of decentralization should be 
able to implement more effective programs. On the one hand regional authorities are expected 
                                                 
4 for an overview on the mechanisms of European regional policy: 
http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/s24000.htm to  have  better  information  on  specific  growth  inducing  projects.  On  the  other  hand  there 
should  be  a  more  effective  regional  implementation  of  the  programs  in  traditionally 
decentralized countries with regional authorities that have a higher administrative capacity. 
In this paper we try to establish some evidence for the connection between a higher degree of 
decentralization and a higher effectiveness of Structural Funds expenditure. Therefore, we 
will  estimate  an  initial  level-growth  regression  taking  into  account  Structural  Funds 
expenditure  and  a  measure  of  decentralization.  While  the  employed  empirics  are  closely 
related to Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis (2006), who assess the conditional effectiveness of 
Structural Funds, this paper emphasizes the impact of decentralization on the policy outcome. 
 
3. The Model 
 
In order to verify the impact, the federal structure of a Member State has on the effectiveness 
of Structural Funds expenditure we estimate a pooled cross-sectional regression  
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where the included variables denote growth of per capita GDP (git) as the dependent variable, 
and as independent variables the initial per capita GDP in period t (yit), the domestic savings 
rate (sk,it), the rate of human capital accumulation (sh,it), the rate of population growth (nit), the 
exogenous rate of technological progress (gA), and the rate of depreciation (δ). In order to test 
the hypothesis that Structural Funds expenditure is more effective for growth when countries 
exhibit a higher degree of decentralization, we include a measure for the Structural Funds 
expenditure  (SFit)  and  a  term  that  interacts  the  degree  of  decentralization  (TDit)  with  the 
Structural  Funds  expenditure.  Setting  β5  and  β6  to  zero  the  model  relates  to  the  standard 
empirical growth model as suggested by Mankiw, Romer and Weill (1992). We will report 
results on this specification as a point of reference. 
The panel we use for estimating the model includes 13 EU countries
5 and covers seven five-
year periods from 1960-1965 to 1990-1995 as in Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis (2006). 
Accordingly,  each  observation  represents  a  five-year  average  of  the  respective  variable. 
Discussing the merits of the panel data approach Islam (2003) emphasizes the alleviation of 
the  omitted  variable  problem.  While  choosing  five-year  periods  may  give  rise  to  a  short 
frequency problem, it is defended by Islam (2003: 332).  
                                                 
5 The sample includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Germany is missing due to the structural break in 1990, for Luxembourg 
the human capital variable is missing.  We estimate the model as a pooled OLS regression using panel corrected standard errors that 
are robust to heteroscedasticity and allow for possible contemporaneous correlation across 
panels. As data on the decentralization variable are not available for all countries for the first 
and the second five-year period there arises the issue of a possible selection bias. It can be 
shown, that in the given data this does not pose a real problem (see e.g. Wooldridge 2002: 
580ff.). 
 
4. The Data 
 
In  our  analysis  we  use  data  on  GDP,  savings,  human  capital,  population  growth,  and 
decentralization. The dataset used is largely the same as in Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis 
(2006).
6 The Data on GDP, population, and savings are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 2000. Data on GDP is given in constant 1995 $. The growth rates of 
GDP  and  population  are  calculated  as  gy = (yT/y0)
1/T – 1.  Savings  are  measured  by  gross 
domestic capital formation as a percentage of GDP. The variable on human capital is taken 
from Domenech and De LaFuente (2006). They derive it from various international sources 
on educational attainment levels as a measure of average years of schooling.
7 The variable 
covering Structural Funds expenditure from 1975-1986 is constructed using information given 
in Vanhove (1999). For the period from 1986-1998 Domenech, Maudes and Varela (2000) 
provide data on a wide range of financial flows related to the EU’s regional policy
8. Receipts 
from the ERDF as percentage of GDP are used as a proxy for the Structural Funds, as it is the 
most  important  single  fund  within  the  system  of  Structural  Funds.
9  For  the  rates  of 
technological progress and depreciation we set gA+ δ = 0.05 for all countries and time periods 
as it is standard in the growth literature (e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weill 1992; Islam 1995).  
The indicator for decentralization was established by Stegarescu (2004). It measures the share 
of  sub-national  tax  revenue.  The  distinguishing  property  of  this  measure  is  that  it  takes 
account of the degree of decision-making power the sub-national authority has on the tax. In 
doing so, it does not just distinguish between federal and unitary states, but includes the actual 
discretion sub-national authorities have on their own tax-policy. Stegarescu (2004) develops 
three different measures of tax decentralization that he labels TDec1, TDec2,  and TDec3 
respectively. For this purpose, he builds on a classification for tax autonomy first developed 
in OECD (1999) ordering taxes according to the degree of control sub-national governments 
                                                 
6 It is published by H. de Groot at: http://www.henridegroot.net/pdf/database_sf.xls 
7 It is available at: http://iei.uv.es/~rdomenec/human/human.html 
8 This dataset can be downloaded from: http://iei.uv.es/~rdomenec/EUbudget/EUbudget.html 
9 For a discussion of the data sources see also Ederveen, de Groot, and Nahuis (2006). have on the tax base, the tax rate, or both of them. The measures of tax decentralization relate 
the  amount  of  tax  revenue  the  sub-central  governments  control  to  the  tax  revenue  of 
consolidated  general  government.  As  TDec3  relates  the  total  tax  revenue  a  sub-central 
government receives to the tax revenue of general government, TDec1 considers only the 
revenues from those taxes, on which the sub-national authorities alone decide on either tax 
base or tax rate or both of them. TDec2 then additionally considers revenue from shared taxes 
(Stegarescu, 2004: 7).  
Stegarescu (2005) shows that the consideration of different indicators of tax decentralization 
leads  to  different  results  regarding  centralization  or  decentralization  when  subnational 
authorities  participate  in  central  government  decision  making.  For  our  purpose  we  would 
actually  need  a  measure  for  the  discretion  sub-national  authorities  have  on  co-financing 
structural funds expenditures. As there is no such measure, we consider Stegarescu’s measure 
as an appropriate proxy. The implicit assumption is then, that greater autonomy in deciding on 
spending on projects where structural funds are involved goes hand in hand with greater sub-
national tax-autonomy. 
Both, the decentralization indicator and the measure of Structural Funds can take the value of 
zero. To avoid problems when taking the natural logarithm of those measures we add 1 to the 
values before taking the logarithm.  
 
5. The Results 
 
In table 1 we present the first results from the regression. It presents the results for the basic 
regression, the inclusion of Structural Funds as an explanatory variable and the inclusion of 
the variable interacting Structural Funds and with the three measure of decentralization. 
In the basic regression the relationship between the initial per capita income and growth of per 
capita GDP is negative and highly significant. This represents convergence across the EU-
Member States in the sample during the period 1960-1995. The implied speed of convergence 
is 0.029.
10 The coefficients on the other variables also show the expected signs. Average 
domestic capital investment and investment in human capital prove to be growth promoting; 
the coefficient on the variable that captures population growth and depreciation is negative, 
although the coefficients on the latter two variables are not significant. 
When entering the Structural Funds variable into the regression, the general results do not 
change.  The  convergence  hypothesis  still  holds  and  the  signs  on  the  coefficients  remain 
unchanged.  The  coefficient  on  the  investment  variable  drops  from  0.020  to  0.018,  the 
                                                 
10 The speed of convergence λ can be derived from the coefficient as -0.029*5 = -(1-e
5λ) (see e.g. Islam 1995). coefficient on human capital from 0.024 to 0.023, while the coefficient on the population 
drops from -0.022 to -0.029, the latter two still not being significantly different from zero. The 
receipt of Structural Funds as such has a negative effect on per capita growth. However, this 
effect is not significantly different from zero neither at the 5%- or 10%-levels. 
 
Table 1: Impact of Decentralization on the Effectiveness of Structural Funds. Dependent Variable: 
Growth of per capita GDP 
   Basic   SF   TD1   TD2   TD3 
Variables           
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R-squared   0.47   0.49   0.46   0.46   0.45 
Number of obs    91   91   80   80   80 
Number of groups   13   13   13   13   13 
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-levels, respectively. 
 
When the different measures of decentralization are entered into the equation as an interactive 
term  with  the  Structural  Funds,  the  coefficient  on  the  Structural  Funds  turns  out  to  be 
significantly negative. Also, the coefficient increases in size to -0.040. For the initial per 
capita income the coefficient increases by 0.005 but is still highly significant. A remarkable 
result is that the coefficient on the population variable increases in size and significance, when 
the measures of decentralization are entered into the equation.  
While the receipt of Structural Funds as such appears to have a negative impact on per capita 
income  growth,  receipts  of  Structural  Funds  do  have  a  positive  effect,  when  they  are 
interacted  with  decentralization.  On  all  of  the  three  measures  of  decentralization,  the 
coefficients are positive and significant at the 1%-level. This can be taken as a evidence that 
the  effect  of  Structural  Funds  spending  is  more  beneficial  in  countries  that  have  a  more 
decentralized  structure.  The  differences  in  size  between  the  coefficients  on  the  different 
measures  of  decentralization  are  not  very  huge.  So  the  differing  degrees  of  tax 
decentralization across countries and time can be assumed to have a stronger impact than the differences  in  the  form  tax  decentralization.  While  the  coefficients  on  the  TD1  and  TD2 
measures are very close, the TD3 measure differs slightly more. 
Due to data availability (cf. section 3) the panel becomes unbalanced when introducing the 
measures of tax decentralization. As stated above in the example at hand the consistency of 
the estimators is not negatively affected. One can also show, that restricting the sample to a 
shorter  period,  for  which  it  is  balanced,  does  not  change  the  general  results  which  are 
available on request.  
In order to assess the validity of the results we present in the following some robustness 
analyses that were performed on the data.  In presenting the results we focus on the TD1 
indicator as it has the closest relation to our notion of decentralization. The results for the 
other two indicators are very close to those presented and available on request.  
In table 2 we recapitulate the result of the regression using the TD1 indicator as an interacting 
variable  with  the  receipts  of  Structural  Funds.  When  introducing  the  tax  decentralization 
variable itself into the regression its value is practically zero. Also, all the other coefficients 
are almost unaffected by the introduction of this variable. This means that an independent 
growth-effect of a country’s decentralized structure cannot be established within this panel.  
All of the positive impact of the decentralized structure has to be attributed to the interaction 
with the Structural Funds.  
 
Table 2: Robustness Analysis. Dependent Variable: Growth of per capita GDP 
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R-squared    0.46   0.46   0.48   0.51 
Observations   80   80   80   80 
Groups   13   13   13   13 
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-levels, respectively. The  introduction  of  a  dummy  variable  measuring  the  time  of  EU-membership  leaves  the 
results of the basic specification largely unaffected. The negative impact of initial per capita 
income and receipts of Structural Funds and the positive impact of average investment in 
physical and human capital are slightly increased, whereas the coefficient on the interaction 
term  is  somewhat  decreasing.  The  coefficient  on  the  EU-dummy  variable  is  small  and 
significant only at the 10%-level. We can therefore conclude that, while being an EU-member 
has a small positive impact on growth, the impact of the Structural Funds on growth is not 
affected by the duration of the EU-membership. Also, the positive impact of a decentralized 
internal fabric of a country on the conditional effectiveness of Structural Funds is not affected. 
As the cohesion countries received particularly large amounts of support via the Structural 
Funds one might suspect that the effect of these expenditures is especially strong in those 
countries. We entered a dummy-variable for the cohesion countries to control for the possible 
effects.  Judging  from  the  variable  on  initial  income,  the  trend  to  convergence  becomes 
slightly more pronounced, with the dummy-variable included. The coefficient on the dummy-
variable  indicates  a  somewhat  lower  growth  for  the  cohesion  countries.  Besides  this, 
Structural Funds itself have a less negative effect on growth. Our variable of concern, the 
interaction term comprising Structural Funds and decentralization remains increases slightly, 




This paper tried to show that the  effectiveness of regional policy in the European Union 
depends among others on the internal fabric of the Union’s member states. One distinguishing 
feature of the member states is their differing degree of decentralization. In order to display 
the  connection  between  sub-national  autonomy  and  the  effectiveness  of  Structural  Funds 
expenditure an empirical model was estimated. An interaction variable comprising Structural 
Funds  expenditure  and  a  decentralization  measure  was  introduced  to  the  model  to  take 
account of this effect. 
While Structural Funds expenditure cannot be said to be unambiguously growth promoting in 
itself, a significantly positive effect of Structural Funds on growth was found when they are 
interacted with a decentralized structure of a country. The effect holds also for the applied 
robustness checks.  
As these are encouraging first results, further research on the concrete mechanisms in which 
sub-national autonomy affects the effectiveness of regional policy is needed to explore the 
issue in more detail. Literature 
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